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The paper examines facets of the emerging international 
regulatory structure largely around Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations (RFMOs) in the South Indian Ocean 
sector of the 'Greater Southern Ocean', both north and south of the 
Antarctic Convergence. In the South Indian Ocean sector, apart 
from the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources where India is a decision-making and Pakistan a 
non decision-making party, no South Asian state is a party to any 
operative RFMOs. Surprisingly, this non-participation includes 
the South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement. The paper reflects on 
the varying conceptions of the 'South Indian Ocean', particularly 
within Indian strategic discourse. It encourages critical thinking by 
South Asian social sciences scholars about framings, interests, and 
South Asian engagement in South Indian Ocean institutional 
development. 
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Introduction
The focus of this paper is South Asia's (and particularly India's) 
engagement with Antarctica, but not with the continent that is 
ordinarily taken to mean 'the Antarctic'. Here it is the oceanic area 
that attracts our attention. The better biophysical, legal and 
geopolitical conception of Antarctica captures the entire 
continental, insular and oceanic area south of the circumpolar 
Antarctic Convergence or Polar Front (Antarctic Convergence 
here).  It is within this oceanic area of Antarctica, and in a further 
oceanic band immediately to its north, that some of the greatest 
economic transformations – and as a result, geopolitical 
transformations – in the entire Antarctic region are presently 
occurring. These transformations include increasing levels and 
diversity of human activities associated with marine harvesting, 
tourism, maritime traffic and potentially minerals resource 
activities. This pattern of transformation is evident in the oceans of 
both polar regions (Dodds and Hemmings, 2015). This does not 
appear to be a transient event in regional terms; indeed such trends 
as are presently discernable appear likely to deepen and accelerate 
over the next decades. To a greater or lesser extent, these trends are 
evident all around Antarctica. But, for a variety of reasons which 
will be considered below, they appear currently most advanced in 
the South Indian Ocean region, and (at least to an outside observer) 
to present particular challenges there. 
Strikingly, the activities now occurring in the oceanic area of 
Antarctica in the South Indian Ocean region, and the institutional 
development that both responds to and enables it, is only weakly 
engaged with by the states to the immediate north – the states of 
South Asia. South Asia is understood here as the states which are 
parties to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 
thus: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, the 
Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Cohen, 2015: 341). To an 
outsider, the presently limited engagement of South Asia in the 
South Indian Ocean region of Antarctica seems anomalous, given 
the profile of the Indian Ocean in the domestic and regional policy 
debate within Indian policy elites in particular (Karnad, 2015), and 
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increasingly at the international level. The latter includes both 
national strategic assessments (e.g. [US] National Intelligence 
Council 2012, [Australian] Defence Department 2016) – 
particularly in relation to concerns about Chinese 'expansion' 
into 'the Indian and Pacific Oceans' (Secretary of the Navy, 2015: 3) 
and popular coverage of the region (Kaplan, 2010). The present 
paper is intended as a modest opening of a discourse around what 
horizons South Asia, and India in particular, might have in the far 
south of the historically critical Indian Ocean if we are indeed to see 
'a new cosmopolitanism in a postcolonial setting' (Bose, 2006: 282). 
It forms part of an ongoing and broader research project around 
the transformation of Antarctic politics (Hemmings, 2017) and 
what I have termed 'The Greater Southern Ocean' (Hemmings, 
2016).
This Antarctic Convergence varies in its location around the 
Antarctic continent. In the South Pacific sector it occurs at 60° 
South (S.); in the South Atlantic at 50° S.; south of Australia at 55° S.; 
and in the South Indian Ocean (the particular focus of this paper) at 
45° S. All these positions are approximations, since the Antarctic 
Convergence is a dynamic feature. These approximations to the 
position of the Antarctic Convergence are provided by the 
northern boundary of the Convention on the Conservation of 
1Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) , which is 
specifically defined in Article I of that convention, and illustrated 
in Figure 1 below showing the convention area.
The CCAMLR area reflects the historic significance of the 
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) in the international governance of 
the Antarctic region. The ATS is anchored in the Antarctic Treaty of 
1959, which provided an accommodation through its famous 
Article IV in relation to the various positions around unresolved 
territorial sovereignty situation on the Antarctic continent and 
islands south of 60° S.; gave parties open-access to all parts of 
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 1Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, adopted in 
Canberra 20 May 1980, entered into force 7 April 1982, 1329 UNTS 48.
Antarctica; established a contingent demilitarization of, and 
obligation to peaceful purposes in, the entire area south of 60° S.; 
encouraged international cooperation; established science as both 
the primary mechanism of national presence and as the 
declaratory purpose of the international cooperation. Whilst 
initially involving only twelve states, membership has grown to 
include now twenty-nine decision-making Consultative Parties 
and twenty-four Non-Consultative Parties which are not involved 
2in decision-making.  The 1959 treaty did not address resource 
issues, but the institutional architecture that it established has 
allowed subsequent and separate treatment of the resumption of 
commercial sealing, through the 1972 Convention on the 
3Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS);  the 1980 CCAMLR 
already mentioned; the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of 
4Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) , which was 
abandoned before coming into force and replaced by the 1991 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
5(Madrid Protocol) . For a recent substantive background on the 
ATS, see Ben Saul and Tim Stephens' introduction to their 
Antarctica in International Law (2015).
Whilst the 1959 treaty notionally applied to the entire area 
south of 60° S., there was uncertainty in relation to its capacity in 
these oceanic areas. Whilst Article VI of the treaty established that 
it should 'apply to the area south of 60 South Latitude, including all 
ice shelves', the same article then went on to say:
132
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2 A complete list of the Parties to the Antarctic Treaty is available at the Antarctic 
Treaty Secretariat website at http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e 
(accessed July 19, 2016).
3 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, adopted in London 1 June 
1972, entered into force 11 March 1978, 1080 UNTS176.
4 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, adopted in 
Wellington  2 June 1988, never entered into force, 27 ILM 868.
5 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, adopted in Madrid 4 
October 1991, entered into force 14 January 1998, 30 ILM 1455.
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but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way 
affect the rights, or the exercise of rights, of any state under 
international law with regard to the high seas within that area.
These reservations around traditional high seas freedoms 
were seen as applying not only to other states which were not party 
to the Antarctic Treaty, but to the Parties themselves. Particularly 
in the context of the Cold War, nobody was prepared to assume a 
general waiver of high seas freedoms, even if within the Antarctic 
Treaty Area to which Parties had just agreed.
This is the reason why seals and later marine harvesting were 
not considered tractable within the Antarctic Treaty, and CCAS 
and CCAMLR were negotiated and adopted as separate 
instruments.  The successive main conventions adopted after the 
Antarctic Treaty have therefore taken the ATS increasingly into the 
oceanic realm of the Southern Ocean. Whereas, CCAS, CRAMRA 
(had it entered into force) and the Madrid Protocol, like the 
Antarctic Treaty, have an identical area of application – the area 
south of 60° S. – CCAMLR's area of application is even greater, 
extending northward, as we have noted, to the Antarctic 
Convergence. Although all of the ATS main instruments in force 
(and a host of subsidiary agreements under these) may have 
application in the Southern Ocean, it is generally CCAMLR that is 
most significant in this respect. Not only does it apply to the larger 
area, but its focus (marine harvesting) is presently the dominant 
economic activity in the entire Antarctic region (its nearest 
competitor - tourism - is substantially less capitalised and still 
largely centred on the continent of Antarctica) and the primary 
resource activity that is covered by any instrument of the ATS. The 
other long term marine living resource activity, whaling, is subject 
to a separate International Convention for the Regulation of 
6Whaling (ICRW) and its International Whaling Commission , 
outside the ATS. Potential activities on the deep seabed would fall, 
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DC 2 December 1946, entered into force 10 November 1948, 161 UNTS 72.
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7through the Law of the Sea Convention , to the International 
8Seabed Authority under Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention , 
which of course is also outside the ATS. Biological prospecting is 
not separately regulated under the ATS but it is subject to its 
generic obligations (see Joyner, 2012), and also subject to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), although the 
jurisdictional lines between the ATS and CBD have not yet been 
clarified in the Antarctic.
134
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7 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted in Montego Bay 10 
December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 397.
8 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (Part XI Deep-Sea Mining 
Agreement, adopted in New York on 28 July 1984, entered into force 28 July  1996, 
1836 UNTS 42,
Figure 1: The CCAMLR Area
Source: CCAMLR Secretariat,https://www.ccamlr.org/en/system/files/ 
CCAMLR-convention- area-map-large.pdf 
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Historically, the substantive regional regulatory structure of 
the ATS was bounded by a sort of cordon sanitaire in which little 
human activity occurred immediately north of the Antarctic 
Convergence. As a result, whilst key global instruments such as the 
Law of the Sea Convention clearly applied there, in practice there 
was so little activity that this was essentially moot. For the same 
reasons, there was little regional institutional development. Taxa-
specific instruments addressing cetaceans (ICRW) and southern 
bluefin tuna (the Convention for the Conservation of Southern 
9Bluefin Tuna (CSBT) , whilst periodically exciting contention 
within their institutional context, were thematically isolated, and 
effectively decoupled from the ATS, even when one might have 
expected otherwise (Hemmings, 2006). 
This picture has now significantly changed. First, we have seen 
the extension of fisheries into areas beyond national jurisdiction in 
the ocean space between the southern inhabited continents and 
Antarctica, and the associated adoption of major new Regional 
Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) in the South 
Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans. Each of these three new 
RFMOs (considered in detail below) takes CCAMLR's northern 
boundary (the approximation to the Antarctic Convergence) as 
their southern boundary. Secondly, there is the growing economic 
and strategic focus on southern sea lanes and trade routes. This has 
arisen through global economic growth, including in the Global 
South (in South, South East and East Asia in particular), with 
consequential changes in the regional and global order. This 
includes the associated power projection by emerging global 
powers, most obviously China and India, alongside (or in 
competition with) the dominant global power of the United States. 
Thirdly, we are seeing the transformation of the biophysical reality 
through the agency of anthropogenic climate change, whereby 
historic oceanic boundary, circulatory, and ecological verities are 
in flux. 
135
Research Journal Social Sciences, 24,1& 2 (2016) : 129-153
9 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, adopted in Canberra 
10 May 1993, entered into force 20 May 1994, 1819 UNTS 359.
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These changes mean that the functional area for the 
management of the area around Antarctica – what I term 'The 
Greater Southern Ocean' – is now probably better seen as the 
oceanic area up to around 35º S. Greater precision is probably not 
possible yet. This is, obviously, a much larger area than that 
circumscribed by the Antarctic Convergence, and a more 
complicated jurisdictional space. In the Indian Ocean sector of 
Antarctica, this translates into a 'South Indian Ocean' starting 
at 35º S., and continuing down to the coast of the Antarctic 
continent. At some point (and this could be the Antarctic 
Convergence, or it could be the Antarctic Treaty Area boundary at 
60º S.) the 'Indian' becomes the 'Southern” Ocean. But functionally 
it is the same space, and it makes sense to have an overall strategic 
conception and policy in relation to it. Operationally, how one 
operates in this space alters at 60º S., when one enters the Antarctic 
Treaty Area.
The paper is structured as follows: It opens with a summary of 
South Asian engagement in the regional institutions providing the 
international governance architecture in 'The Greater Southern 
Ocean'; first within the Antarctic Treaty System; then in four 
RFMOs that manage fisheries in this ocean space – two of which 
have a particular focus on the South Indian Ocean. The paper then 
reflects upon the general economic and geopolitical considerations 
which have driven states to the development of this governance 
architecture, and follows this with some observations on both the 
declaratory, and seemingly evident, interests of South Asia – and 
in particular India – in the ocean space variously understood as the 
'South Indian Ocean'. The paper concludes with some brief 
observations on the options for South Asian states in relation to 
these matters.
South Asia in the Antarctic Treaty System
In the post World War II period of the late 1940s and 1950s, when 
the options for addressing what was termed 'the Antarctic 
Problem' in an international context were first considered, the only 
136
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South Asian state that was in a position to give the matter any 
intellectual attention was India. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
articulated the case for a wider international interest in the region, 
but post-independence India plainly had to prioritize domestic 
and near-region policy issues (Chaturvedi, 2013a), and was unable 
then to either establish an Antarctic presence, participate in the 
International Geophysical Year programs in Antarctica, persist in 
its UN engagement in relation to Antarctica (Chaturvedi, 2013b: 
54-57), or subsequently break into the narrow group of states 
(including the Soviet Union) collected together by the United 
States for the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Antarctic 
Treaty. Nehru provides perhaps the first true internationalist 
perspective on Antarctica as a political space, but active Indian 
engagement took several more decades to eventuate. No other 
South Asian state has a comparable history of high-level 
engagement.  
Whilst individual Indian scientists participated in the 
programs of other Antarctic states from the early 1960s, steps 
towards an autonomous Indian presence only commenced in the 
1980s, a decade in Antarctica that saw a 'discursive transformation, 
especially with respect to its actual and imagined resource 
endowment' (Chaturvedi, 2013b: 57). India's first expeditionary 
landing in Antarctica occurred in January 1982. Union-level sign 
off on the decision to join the Antarctic Treaty occurred in July 1983 
and India acceded to the treaty on August 19 1983, and was 
10accorded Consultative Party status on September 12 1983 – which 
is still by far the shortest period between a state acceding to the 
Antarctic Treaty and gaining the top-tier decision-making status of 
a Consultative Party. Chaturvedi, Khare and Pandey (2005) 
provide details of this formative period for India in relation to the 
Antarctic. In the 1980s the Antarctic Treaty parties were in the 
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website at http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e (accessed on July 
19, 2016).
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midst of contentious Antarctic mineral negotiations and exposed 
to criticism that they (largely Western states and a minority of the 
world's states) were appropriating the continent, particularly in 
the annual 'Question of Antarctica' debates in the United Nations 
General Assembly. India's accession (and that of other major states 
in the Global South) during the mid-1980s was argued as evidence 
that the ATS was an open-access regime. So there were both 
domestic Indian and external 'demand-side' factors in the precise 
timing of India's arrival in the ATS. India has operated three main 
Antarctic stations: the seasonal station Dakshin Gangotri (1983), 
which Indian officials advice is now abandoned, and the two 
11functioning  year-round stations Maitri (1989), and Bharati (2012).  
In 2007 India hosted the Thirtieth annual Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting in New Delhi (Secretariat of the Antarctic 
Treaty, 2007).
The only other South Asian state to accede to the Antarctic 
Treaty is Pakistan, but this only occurred on 1 March 2012, and 
Pakistan remains a Non-Consultative Party, and therefore is not 
involved in decision-making at the Annual Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings (ATCMs), although it may attend and 
participate. Pakistan established a small Antarctic station (Jinnah) 
in 1991, which, with other sites, has since been only sporadically 
operated during the summer.
Both India and Pakistan are parties to other component 
instruments of the ATS. They are the only South Asian states in the 
ATS. Whilst neither are parties to CCAS, both are parties to the 
Madrid Protocol (January 14, 1998 and March 31, 2012 
respectively). More immediately pertinent is that both India and 
138
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12Pakistan are parties to CCAMLR . India is, as in relation to the 
Antarctic Treaty, a decision-making state – what is termed a 
Member of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources, established under Article VII of the 
Convention. The criterion for this is, in India's case, that it is 
"engaged in research or harvesting activities in relation to the 
13marine living resources to which this Convention applies."  India 
has been a Member of the Commission since 1985. Pakistan is, since 
2012, an Acceding State to CCAMLR and, in the absence of the 
required research or harvesting activity, is not a decision-making 
state.
To summarise this situation: Only two South Asian states are 
party to ATS instruments: India and Pakistan, which are each 
parties to the Antarctic Treaty and CCAMLR. India is a decision-
making state in relation to both instruments and Pakistan a non 
decision-making state.
South Asia in the Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations Abutting Antarctica
The Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)
CCSBT, which has already been mentioned, concerns itself with 
14southern bluefin tuna Thunnus maccoyii,  across their range. This 
species is "found throughout the southern hemisphere mainly in 
waters between 30 and 50 degrees south but only rarely in the 
eastern Pacific. The only known breeding area is in the Indian 
15Ocean, south-east of Java, Indonesia".  Five states are party to the 
Commission (Australia, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand and the 
Republic of Korea). Four other state-level entities (The European 
139
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content/about-southern-bluefin-tuna (accessed on July 19, 2016).
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Union, Fishing Entity of Taiwan, South Africa and the United 
States) are Observers (Commission for the Conservation of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna 2015). No South Asian State is engaged 
with CCSBT.
Three other RFMOs that abut the CCAMLR area have been 
mentioned above: 
The South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO)
SEAFO, which gives effect to the Convention on the Conservation 
and Management of Fishery Resources in the South East Atlantic 
16 17Ocean.  There are seven Commission Members.  No South Asian 
state is a party.
The South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation 
(SPRFMO)
SPRFMO, which gives effect to the Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in 
18the South Pacific Ocean.  There are fourteen Commission 
19Members, and four Cooperating non-Contracting Parties.  No 
South Asian state is a party.
140
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South East Atlantic Ocean, adopted in Windhoek 20 April 2001, entered into force 
13 April 2003, 41(2) ILM 257. 
17 South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation website at http://www.seafo.org/ 
About/Contracting-Parties (accessed  19 July 2016).
18 Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery 
Resources in the South Pacific Ocean, adopted in Wellington 14 November 2009, 
entered into force 24 August 2012, ATS 28.
19South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation website at 
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The Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA)
20SIOFA,  has eight Commission Members (Australia, Cook Islands, 
European Union, France, Japan, Republic of Korea, and two Indian 
21Ocean states: Mauritius and the Seychelles).  Again, no South 
Asian state is a party. SIOFA's area of application (Figure 2) is 
defined in Article 3 of the Convention:
Commencing at the landfall on the continent of Africa of the 
parallel of 10° North; from there east along that parallel to its 
intersection with the meridian of 65° East; from there south 
141
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Figure 2: The SIOFA Area
Source: FAO, Regional Fishery Bodies Summary Descriptions, South Indian 
Ocean Fisheries Agreement, http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/siofa/en#Org-
OrgsInvolved 
20 Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement, adopted in Rome 7 July 2006, 
entered into force 21 June 2012, UNTS Reg. No I-49647.
21 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations website at  http:// 
www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/siofa/en#Org-OrgsInvolved (accessed 19 July 2016).
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along that meridian to its intersection with the equator; from 
there east along the equator to its intersection with the 
meridian of 80° East; from there south along that meridian to 
its intersection with the parallel of 20° South; from there east 
along that parallel to its landfall on the continent of Australia; 
from there south and then east along the coast of Australia to 
its intersection with the meridian of 120° East; from there south 
along that meridian to its intersection with the parallel of 55° 
South; from there west along that parallel to its intersection 
with the meridian of 80° East; from there north along that 
meridian to its intersection with the parallel of 45° South; from 
there west along that parallel to its intersection with the 
meridian of 30° East; from there north along that meridian to 
its landfall on the continent of Africa.
General Economic and Geopolitical Factors Driving South 
Indian Ocean Institutional Development 
The dominant economic activity in the ocean space of the South 
Indian Ocean, as elsewhere in the circumpolar Greater Southern 
Ocean, is currently marine harvesting – 'fishing'. Considering the 
entire circumpolar space, fishing activity is most actively pursued 
by European (including Russian); East Asian (most notably Japan, 
South Korea and increasingly China); and (to a lesser extent) South 
American and Southern African entities. The national identities 
notionally attached reflect where the economic control of the 
activity resides. In practice, the vessels may be registered just about 
anywhere, and whilst the senior officers of the fishing vessels 
generally come from the states where the activity is economically 
controlled, crews are now drawn from a global pool and are often 
from the Global South. Amongst the factors which have 
contributed to the establishment, and particularly the recent 
growth, of this fishing activity in higher latitudes are:
1. The continuing effects of the Law of the Sea Convention's 
establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). What 
were historically referred to as distant water fishing fleets, 
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continue to be displaced into areas beyond national 
jurisdiction;
2. Overfishing in traditional/historic fishing grounds, 
which has depleted particular stocks and drives the 
fishing industry to seek new stocks further afield;
3. Increased demand for fish and fish products, in part 
generated by the emergence of new wealth and consumer 
communities, including in the Global South;
4. Technological enablement, which means that previously 
remote and severe ocean areas may now be more readily 
accessed and fished; and
5. Perhaps the geopolitically perceived need for states to 
demonstrate presence and acquire or retain influence in 
areas that may be seen as strategically significant.
The institutional architecture that is most developed relates 
precisely to the management of fishing. For the South Indian 
Ocean this comprises successive 'shells' provided by CCAMLR, 
CCSBT and SIOFA. These provide a Southern Ocean / South 
Indian Ocean fisheries regime from the shores of the Antarctic 
continent at approximately 66º S. up to (at its furthest north) 10º N., 
and across the entire width of the South Indian Ocean from the 
coast of Africa to the coast of Australia. This is a massive area. Only 
three states: Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea, are parties 
to all three instruments; but France and the European Union are 
party to CCAMLR and SIOFA. This pattern is of itself perhaps not 
surprising. Japan and South Korea are global fishing states, with 
active participation in most RFMOs. Australia is an Indian Ocean 
littoral state, with its metropolitan territory to the east, a 
subantarctic island territory in the Heard and MacDonald Islands 
in the South Indian Ocean, and a generally unrecognised Antarctic 
territorial claim to the extreme south of the area in question. France 
possesses four island territories in the South Indian Ocean, 
comprising subantarctic Crozet and Kerguelen and the 
Amsterdam and St Paul archipelagos. These, plus the French 
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Antarctic claim (which is south of Tasmania and thus not within 
the Indian Ocean sector considered here) are administered by 
France as the Terres Australes et Antarctiques Françaises (Aldrich 
and Connell, 1992: 51). For 'territorial' states such as Australia and 
France, the involvement in fishing activity in areas relatively 
proximate to their EEZs is a factor. So too is their 'strategic' interest 
in these areas, which have long been within the policy and security 
purviews of their governments. The EU, through the Common 
22Fisheries Policy,  is the primary voice of Europe in global fisheries 
bodies, although France and the United Kingdom have autonomy 
23in relation to their vestigial colonial possessions,  and may explain 
the non-participation of key fishing states such as Spain as separate 
parties.
In the longer term – and over what time horizon this might 
eventuate is presently unclear – deep seabed mining and biological 
prospecting (the latter potentially through the water column, 
seamounts and the deep seabed) are further possible activities in 
the region. A discussion of the complexities of ocean management, 
and the variety of challenges in this environment, is beyond the 
scope of this paper (but see Smith, Suárez de Vivero and Agardy, 
2015). It is not unreasonable to see, even in the best of situations, 
that oceans management in the South Indian Ocean is likely to 
involve more issues and thus to become more complex. 
Immediate conventional 'security' interests in these oceanic 
areas may not be particularly acute at the present time (and this 
may be one region of relatively low concern about 'terrorism'), but 
the enduring strategic attention to sea lines of communications and 
control means that for major powers this is also likely to be a matter 
of interest in even the higher latitudes of the South Indian Ocean. 
The extent to which the greater regional or global security situation 
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ebbs and flows (the 'West' vs China, the US vs China, India vs 
China, etc.), and how both the present and potential economic 
interests actually develop in the South Indian Ocean over the next 
several decades, will determine the level of security concern in the 
south. For example, a decision (or even a sense that this is a 
possibility) to look at mineral resource activities in Antarctica, 
through an ending of the mining prohibition that is presently in 
place sometime after the middle of this century, might appreciably 
affect states' judgements about engagement in the South Indian 
Ocean more generally. From a contemporary perspective, 
hydrocarbons (oil and gas) from sedimentary basins beneath, or 
offshore, Antarctica appear the most likely incentive to revisit the 
minerals prohibition. But high value minerals known to be present 
on the continent, such as platinum-group metals (if accessible and 
in commercially viable quantities) or polymetallic nodules on the 
24deep seabed (subject to the International Seabed Authority,  in 
addition to whatever authority the ATS may assert and thus 
presenting complex jurisdictional issues) might also stimulate 
reassessment. However, the process for overturning the present 
open-ended minerals prohibition is complex and may not readily 
be achieved (see the detailed discussion on the issues in Gilbert and 
Hemmings, 2015).
Similarly, and perhaps more readily, were the coastal states 
exercising sovereignty over the various subantarctic islands 
mentioned above to initiate or licence major commercial activities 
(or establish military facilities) on these islands, this too might alter 
the calculations. None of this is presently on the horizon, but 
assessments beyond a decade ahead are notoriously difficult. The 
substantive question may be whether it is reasonable to suppose 
that there will be no further instruments negotiated in the South 
Indian Ocean. The present author's assumption is that this is 
unlikely. 
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The Apparent Interests of South Asia in the South India Ocean
To an outsider – and as an Anglo scholar located within an 
Australian-New Zealand-United Kingdom tradition of enquiry, 
notwithstanding a cosmopolitan inclination, the present author is 
plainly such – there are two immediately striking aspects to the 
present South Asian engagement with the South Indian Ocean 
considered here. Firstly, that South Asia, and most particularly its 
largest and most advanced state, India, are so slightly engaged 
with the existing instruments addressing marine harvesting to its 
immediate south. Secondly, and again particularly in relation to 
India, that there appears such a mismatch between the declaratory 
focus amongst Indian foreign policy elites on the South Indian 
Ocean and the state's actual operational engagement in those 
international forums that now exist. A subsidiary point in relation 
to these observations is that the forums that are in existence are 
both at the relatively 'easy' end of international relations and only 
recently elaborated. They are 'easy' because they relate to resource 
and environmental management well away from the metropolitan 
territories of the participating states (rather than, say, use of shared 
waterways or issues of territory), the activity levels are still 
relatively low in global resource-issue terms, and we are near the 
commencement point for the activities that we are seeking to 
manage (so there are fewer entrenched positions). The 
participation costs do not appear to be high, in terms of staffing, 
skills-base, time and cost; nor do the risks of error appear to pose 
such frightening costs that great caution and consideration is 
called for before joining the fray. 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi observed that 'The Indian Ocean 
links India to Antarctica. The entire area is of deep interest to us, 
and ocean studies are of vital importance' (quoted in Dey, 1992: 
177). What Sanjay Chaturvedi has termed 'the Indian Ocean 
dimension of India's Antarctic engagement' has continued ever 
since (Chaturvedi, 2013b: 62-64). So it seems surprising that India 
at least has not involved itself in SIOFA, an RFMO that bridges the 
ocean space between CCAMLR (where India is a Commission 
Member) and the waters immediately south of India itself. 
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Whilst joining the ATS took India into a regime, rather than 
just into the Antarctic Treaty (notwithstanding that acceding to 
that treaty was the necessary first step), and joining SIOFA would 
plainly be a more limited initiative, one might enquire whether it 
would deliver some of the same benefits that the Government of 
India itself identified in Parliament in August 1983 in relation to 
joining the Antarctic system. In Anita Dey's phrasing:
(a) India would be able to exchange scientific information 
with other members … thereby enhanc[ing] its analytical 
capabilities; (b) … project effectively its own views … and 
(c) … be able to participate in the ongoing discussion on 
the resources of Antarctica and ensure that any regime 
that might be set up there would be in harmony with its 
overall policies and objectives (Dey, 1992: 177).
Not only does this nicely capture the benefits that most states 
would likely argue in relation to joining the ATS, it essentially 
states the advantages and purposes for joining any international 
instrument and/or institution. To that extent, precisely these 
arguments could surely be mobilized in relation to joining SIOFA, 
or any of the other RFMOs now surrounding the CCAMLR area.
One question that arises may be quite what is meant, in 
different policy discourses, by the term 'South Indian Ocean'. 
Clearly, at least some of the proponents of an Indian strategic 
policy in the Indian Ocean have a conception of that area as 
including the South Indian Ocean considered in this paper. Thus, 
Bharat Karnad has recently argued for India to be the: 
premier power in the 'strategic quadrant' encompassed by the 
East African littoral and the Caspian Sea in the west, the Sunda 
Strait and western Australian coast in the eastern and 
southeastern reaches of the Indian Ocean, the central Asian 
Republics in the north and the waters up to Antarctica in the 
south …., (Karnad , 2015: 15).
Presumably the same author has this area in mind when he 
cites correspondence with Vice Admiral (Retd) Ganesh identifying 
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'Future strategic tasks … in more remote areas such as the southern 
Indian Ocean trade routes …' (Karnad, 2015: 340), but this is not 
entirely clear. Similarly, President Pranab Mukherjee has stated 
that:
The primary area of Indian maritime interest ranges from the 
Persion Gulf in the north, to Antarctica in the south, and from 
the Cape of Good Hope and the East coast of Africa in the west, 
to the Straits of Malacca and the archipelagos of Malaysia and 
Indonesia in the east (in Scott, 2015: 468).
However, the terms 'South Indian Ocean' or seeming 
analogues such as 'southern Indian Ocean', whilst regularly used 
in Indian strategic and policy writing, are rarely unambiguously 
defined. Thus, the 'Southern Indian Ocean Region, including 
Antarctica' is identified as one of 'India's secondary areas of 
maritime interest' in the Indian Maritime Doctrine (Indian Navy, 
2016: 68). The Doctrine also reports that:
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) has accorded 
pioneer investor status to India of 75,000 sq km of the seabed in 
the southern Indian Ocean. Advances in technology are 
expected to enable deep sea mining, whereupon India may be 
able to harness its own seabed resources, including minerals 
and hydrocarbons. (Indian Navy, 2016: 64)
But in neither case is the actual area constituting the 'Southern 
Indian Ocean' specified.
Indeed, the presumably broader term 'Indian Ocean' is rarely 
operationally defined either. A gap is evident between what may 
be a reasonably clear as a geographical area (the Indian Ocean) and 
exactly what is intended when it comes to applying Indian 
strategic doctrine or strategy to this oceanic space. Some sort of 
boundary is provided by Antarctica to the south (in the case of the 
Indian Maritime Doctrine it appears to be set at 60º S.); the Indian 
Ocean is manifestly a focus of Indian strategic interest; but where 
the South Indian Ocean ends and Antarctica begins is often 
unclear. Indeed, the Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy does 
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not even include 'South', or 'southern Indian Ocean' in its index. 
And so, for a strategic discourse invariably orientated around the 
Indian Ocean, one is left uncertain about what exactly is meant by 
South Indian Ocean. These are not slight issues. Clarity about them 
is critical at multiple levels. First, in relation to ensuring 
compliance with international obligations. The Antarctic Treaty 
Area (south of 60º S.) is an area formally demilitarised; and a 
practice has evolved of not ordinarily deploying active naval 
vessels ('grey hulls') within the area. So, to the degree that 'South 
Indian Ocean' may include areas south of 60º S., this is one 
consideration there.  Second, in relation to actually thinking about 
how one functions – or exercises influence - in a particular locality. 
It may be that influence is not about presence on the sea at all (or 
not only about presence) but about participation in active politico-
legal forums concerned with the area in question. And in order to 
do that, one has to specify the geographical or topical space. And 
finally, a strategic focus (and this does not necessarily mean a 
military focus) generally requires a multi-faceted approach. 
If this is true for India, it is even more the case with the other 
South Asian states, for which no publicly available statement of an 
overall Indian Ocean policy or strategy is available. This is not to 
suggest that these states do not have particular concerns in the 
region. There have, for example, been reports that Pakistan is 
considering promoting the Indian Ocean as a nuclear-free zone 
(Dawn, 2016). None of this is to suggest that it is necessary (far less a 
good idea) for conceptions of the Indian Ocean, or the South Indian 
Ocean, to be securitized (Economic & Political Weekly, 2015). This is 
certainly not the present author's argument. If one takes the 
experience of the Antarctic area, the success of the collaborative 
international project there has been in no small degree due to the 
demilitarization of the region and the development of the ATS 
regime in the context of 'peaceful purposes'. What may be lacking 
here is a thorough regional strategic conception, in its broadest 
sense. Is this just a minor technical/administrative  failing, which 
can be easily rectified; or is it better explained by what  Sanjay 
Chaturvedi has called India's '[lack] of a strategic culture' 
149
Research Journal Social Sciences, 24,1& 2 (2016) : 129-153
Southern Horizons
(Chaturvedi, 2013b: 50)? For an outsider this is very hard to 
determine, but it may warrant further attention by social science 
scholars in South Asia.
Concluding Observations: Options for South Asia
The present author sees a new geopolitical space emerging in 
the circumpolar oceans around Antarctica, including in the 
South Indian Ocean sector. This 'Greater Southern Ocean' region, 
no longer strictly bounded by the Antarctic Convergence, appears 
to be emerging as a new critical functional unit in terms of 
international governance. Whilst presently largely about fishing 
regulation, that activity alone is burgeoning and seems unlikely 
to represent the end point of economic (and thus strategic and 
geopolitical) interest in the region. Without wishing to be 
alarmist, the South Indian Ocean may be one of the more acute 
sectors of this new 'frontier' in oceanic resource and environmental 
aspiration.
Is South Asia happy to leave this space to be shaped – not only 
in relation to the activities, but the international regulatory 
structures – by other states? If the Indian Ocean remains a 
meaningful region for South Asia (and surely it does), then does it 
not have a vital interest in a more active participation in such 
instruments as presently exist – and in those that may yet be to 
come?
An obvious, and of itself not particularly onerous, option is for 
India (and some other South Asian states) to become parties to at 
least SIOFA, and perhaps the other RFMOs considered here. An 
obvious enquiry for scholars is why India has not already become a 
party. But, of itself, joining would alter only the appearance of the 
situation. The critical requirement (and there is nothing peculiar to 
the states of South Asia in this respect) is to engage in a manner and 
at a level that effects influence within the institutions one has 
25joined.  For these separate instruments and institutions need not 
only to work individually by with each other if we are to most 
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effectively and efficiently to manage a huge oceanic space such as 
the South Indian Ocean in our common interests. 
Consideration of what that might entail, of what policy the 
state pursues and the manner in which it does so, with all the 
questions of agency engagement that this entails in a modern 
national polity, are questions not only for another place, but for 
considered analysis by social sciences scholars in South Asia.
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